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Abstract: We use a partial-equilibrium multi-market international model to analyze trade and 
agricultural policies affecting peanut/groundnut products markets. The model covers four goods 
(food and crush quality groundnuts, groundnut oil and cake) in 13 countries/regions including a 
large set of developing countries (Argentina, China, the Gambia, India, Malawi, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa). Welfare is evaluated by looking at the consumer's 
equivalent variation, quasi-profits in farming (groundnut farming, livestock), quasi-profit in 
crushing, and taxpayers’ revenues and outlays implied by distortions. We calibrate the model on 
recent historical data. We analyze several groundnut trade liberalization scenarios. The impact of 
the reforms is measured in deviation from the recent historical baseline. Trade liberalization in 
groundnut markets has a strong South-South dimension opposing two large developing countries 
(India and China) to smaller developing countries mainly located in Africa. Current Chinese and 
Indian policies substantially depress the world prices of edible groundnuts, groundnut oil and 
groundnut meal. Following the removal of these distortions, African exporters present in these 
world markets would gain because they are net sellers of the cash crops. Consumers in China and 
India would be better off as well with lower consumer prices resulting from the removal of high 
tariffs more than offsetting the higher world prices of groundnut oil. The cost of adjustment 
would fall on farmers in India and China who would have to shift to other crops or activities. 
Crushing in India would also decrease because crushing margins would deteriorate. Net buyers 
of groundnut products in OECD countries will be worse off. We draw implications for Doha 
negotiations. 
 
Keywords: Doha, groundnut, peanut, oil, trade liberalization, protection, distortion, negotiations 
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Introduction 
Until 2002, the former policy debate of groundnut/peanut
1 markets was always conducted in a 
North-South context, where U.S. farm and trade policies severely distorted world markets, 
causing important but overlooked distortions in the South. Radical reforms under the 2002 U.S. 
farm bill have removed many of the worst features of the former U.S. peanut program. Trade 
barriers were an essential pillar of the former U.S. peanut program, which generously subsidized 
U.S. growers. With a system of supply controls and price discrimination, U.S. farmers received a 
very high price for “food” peanuts on infra-marginal output (a rectangle of rents) but a lower 
price equal to the world price at the margin for peanuts that had to be exported.
2 This scheme 
was only feasible by limiting imports to minimum levels to force U.S. food processors to buy 
domestic “food” peanuts. The U.S. government restricted imports through tight tariff-rate quotas 
under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA),  
The shift to the new policy was caused by trade liberalization under NAFTA, which acted 
as a disciplining device for domestic policies. As part of its NAFTA obligations, the United 
States had to gradually increase TRQ for groundnut import from NAFTA members. The rising 
imports undermined the domestic price discrimination scheme as cheaper peanuts imports started 
competing with high-price domestic food peanuts.  
As we show later in the paper, the current U.S. policy is now a minor source of distortion 
in groundnut markets. This policy change in the North has brought forth the significant 
distortions within the South and the new policy debate in groundnut markets is occurring in a 
South-South context.  
                                                                  
1Groundnuts and peanuts are synonyms. We use the latter to refer to U.S. markets and policies, and the former for all other 
countries and their policies. 
2The former U.S. peanut program had additional features but the essence of the program was constituted by the two components 
described in the introduction. See Skinner for a detailed description of the former peanut program.  
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Trade liberalization in groundnut markets now opposes vested interest in two large 
developing countries (China and India) to income-generation in smaller developing countries, 
especially in Africa, hence the potential rift within the South. China and India’s policies 
substantially depress the world prices of the three traded commodities considered in our analysis, 
thus reduce the potential of farm income generation in Africa. The removal of trade distortions 
by China and India is essential to ensure an effective trade liberalization of groundnut products 
markets.  
Many developing countries have been reluctant participants in the Doha round. They 
stand to lose their preferential-trade-partner status as multilateral tariff decrease and greater 
market access erodes their preferences. However, in some markets such as groundnuts and 
cotton, many African countries have a comparative advantage that would enable them to 
compete in the world markets and generate rural income and exports earnings, and alleviate rural 
poverty (see Baffes for cotton). If not wasted, such opportunities provide these countries with a 
stake in the Doha round. India and China have other opportunities to reap in the Doha process, 
especially in services and manufacturing trade in the context of their diversified economies. 
Successful conclusion of the Doha round will hinge, among other things, on identifying 
opportunities and tradeoffs palatable to all parties, which allow to overcome the entrenched 
vested interest in protected markets. 
  Despite their importance for small developing countries, groundnut product markets have 
been systematically neglected in policy analysis related to the Doha round using CGE models 
(Beghin, Roland-Host, and van deer Menbrugghe, Anderson et al.) mostly because of data 
constraint in the GTAP commodity coverage. Previous partial equilibrium investigations of 
groundnut policy have assumed exogenous world prices and have narrowly focused on unilateral 
reforms assuming parametric border prices (e.g., Hattie and Lopez; Rucker and Thurman). Our  
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paper fills this void. We use a partial-equilibrium multi-market international model to analyze 
trade and agricultural policies affecting groundnut products markets. The model covers four 
goods (food and crush quality groundnuts, groundnut oil and cake) in 13 countries/regions 
(Argentina, Canada, China, EU-15, the Gambia, India, Malawi, Mexico, Nigeria, Senegal, South 
Africa, the United States, and the Rest of World). Welfare is evaluated by looking at the 
consumer's equivalent variation, quasi-profits in farming (groundnut farming, livestock), quasi-
profit in crushing, and taxpayers’ revenues and outlays implied by distortions. We calibrate the 
model on the most recent historical data. We analyze several groundnut trade liberalization 
scenarios. The impact of the reforms is measured in deviation from the recent historical baseline.  
We show that world trade liberalization, including the removal of trade distortions by 
China and India, would increase groundnut product prices by 15-20 percent above their current 
levels. As a result, net buyers of these products in OECD countries will be worse off, but the 
poorest countries present in these world markets would mostly gain from full trade liberalization 
because they are net sellers of the cash crop and products. Farm income generation in Africa 
would be substantial relative to the size of these economies reaching about $125 million of farm 
profits. Consumers in China and India would be better off as well with lower consumer prices 
resulting from the removal of high tariffs more than offsetting the higher world prices of 
groundnut oil. The cost of adjustment would fall on farmers in India and China who would have 
to shift to other crops or activities. Crushing in India would also decrease because crushing 
margins would deteriorate. We conclude the paper by drawing implications for the Doha 
negotiations. 
 
II. Background Information and Policies  
Groundnuts are one of the world’s main oilseeds crops. They are widely cultivated in developed  
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and developing countries. World groundnut production grew at around 2.3 percent annually over 
the last 20 years, driven by a tremendous growth in China. Global export of edible groundnuts 
increased annually by 2.2 percent, which is in sharp contrast to exports of groundnut oil and meal 
which declined by 1.0 and 2.5 percent per year, respectively, over the last 20 years despite 
growing global consumption of these two products. International trade in groundnuts remained 
thin, with only 5 percent of world production sold in the international market.  
  Groundnuts provide livelihood and cash income to many poor farmers in the 
developing world, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Asia. In Senegal for instance, an 
estimated one million people (one tenth of the population) are involved in groundnut production 
and processing. Groundnuts account for about 2 percent of GDP and 9 percent of exports in 
Senegal (Akobundu). In Gambia, about three-quarters of the farmers grow groundnuts, which 
occupy 53 percent of the arable land. Recent trade policy changes by major players in groundnut 
markets make such analysis timely, if not necessary.  
China is the world’s largest exporter of groundnut (with 32 percent of world edible 
groundnut exports), followed by the United States (19 percent) and Argentina (10.5 percent). 
SSA (Senegal, Gambia, Nigeria, Malawi, South-Africa and Sudan) has lost ground in world 
edible groundnut markets, and collectively accounts for only 5 percent of the world market in 
2001, down from 17 percent in 1976. In the groundnut oil market segment however, Senegal is 
the world’s largest exporter but this market has become all the more thin as other vegetable oils 
are increasingly used as substitutes for groundnut oil. Unlike many other agricultural products 
traded internationally, world prices of groundnuts have not declined during the 1990s but have 
fluctuations widely around $850 per metric ton for both edible groundnuts and groundnut oil.  
U.S. Policies  
With the 2002 farm bill, production quotas are eliminated (with a quota buyout) and the peanut  
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price support program converted to a system of direct and counter-cyclical payments, and a price 
floor  cum  production subsidy (non-recourse loans with marketing loan provisions). The key 
specific features of the new program are the following: (i) all groundnut producers--with or 
without a history of groundnut production-- now have equal access to a marketing loan program, 
under which producers can pledge their crops as collateral to obtain a marketing loan rate equal 
to $355 per short ton. Producers may repay the loan at a rate that is the lesser of USDA-set 
repayment rate plus interest or the marketing loan rate plus interest, or they can forfeit the loan 
(Roveredo and Fletcher); (ii) For producers with a history of groundnut production, a new direct 
and fixed payment of $36 per ton is available. Historic producers are those involved in groundnut 
production during the period 1998-2001. Eligible production would equal the product of average 
yield in the base-period and 85 percent of base-period acres. These payments are made 
regardless of current prices or the actual crop planted, so long as the farm remains in approved 
agricultural uses; (iii) Producers with a history of groundnut production are also eligible for a 
new counter-cyclical payment when market prices are below an established target price of $495 
per ton minus the $36 per ton direct payment. The payment rate is the difference between the 
target price ($495 per ton) minus the direct fixed payment ($36 per ton), and the higher of the 
12-month national average market price for the marketing year for groundnut or the marketing 
assistance loan rate ($355 per short ton). Total counter-cyclical payment to each eligible 
producer is calculated as the product of the payment acres (85 percent of base acres), the base-
year average yield, and the payment rate; (iv) Owners of groundnut quota under the previous 
legislation receive compensation payments for the loss of quota asset value. Payments may be 
made in five annual installments of $220 per short ton during fiscal years 2002-06, or the quota 
owner may opt to take the outstanding payment due in a lump sum. These payments are based on 
the quota owner’s 2001 quota, so long as the person owned a farm eligible groundnut quota.   
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The changes in the U.S. peanut program will affect domestic demand and supply, thus 
domestic prices and U.S. trade flows in several ways. On the demand side, the elimination of 
production quotas decreases the price paid by U.S. food processors and thus, increases domestic 
demand. It also takes away the logic of importing confectionery peanuts to lower the cost of 
processing food items intensive in peanuts. The lower cost of production of peanut butter/paste 
in the United States follows the same logic. The incentive to import cheaper peanut paste/butter 
from Argentina or Mexico has thus been seriously mitigated by the recent changes in the farm 
program. On the production side, production incentives created by the new Farm Program will 
vary among different types of producers but the net effect is likely to be an increase in 
production. The so-called U.S. decoupled payments and counter-cyclical payments do create 
minimal incentives to increase production and can be viewed as supply-inducing subsidies 
(Adams et al. 2001).  
Groundnut policies in India, China, and Argentina  
For all these countries, a general trend since the mid-1990s is a gradual reduction of potentially 
market distorting direct government intervention in production, marketing and international trade 
of groundnut products. However, in response to declines in groundnut product prices, India and 
China often intensify their use of trade policy measures to protect their producers and pursue 
consumption policy goals.  
  India removed most restrictions on domestic trade, storage, and export of groundnuts by 
1998, and allowed futures trading. This latter decision has permitted an important increase in 
futures contracts and even a recent use of on-line trading. However, while export groundnut have 
been freed and imports subject to fewer restrictions, tariffs levels remain very high for all the 
three groundnut products considered here. As Table 1 shows, tariffs on groundnut and groundnut 
oil stood at 45 percent, while that of groundnut meal reached 35 percent in 2001. Furthermore,  
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there are some aspects of the Indian legislation that is costly for producers and users of 
groundnuts and which creates a great deal of inefficiency in the marketing system. One example 
is the obligation to sell and purchase groundnut only in the “Agricultural Produce Wholesale 
Market.” This legislation is costly to both farmers and processors because even if they are 
located very close to each other geographically, they all have to travel to the wholesale market, 
pay an "agent commission" and other marketing fees before the transaction is processed. Another 
example of costly legislation is the small-scale reservation policy in groundnut processing, which 
sets limits on fixed assets in plant and machinery. This policy greatly handicaps domestic 
processors vis-à-vis foreign competitors since they cannot exploit economies of scale.  
As in India, China liberalized to some degree groundnut trade in recent years. Imports of 
groundnuts, which, up to 1999, were the responsibility of only six state companies, are now 
opened to the private firms. However, while the government has committed to cap and reduce 
trade-distorting domestic subsidies as part of its WTO admission agreements, guaranteed prices 
and government procurement schemes remained in place
3. Furthermore, groundnut border 
protection remains high in China, particularly for raw groundnuts. Tariff on raw groundnut was 
30 percent in 2001, to which one should add a value-added tax of 17 percent. Tariffs on 
groundnut oil and groundnut meal were much lower, standing at 9.7 (in-quota) and 5.0 percent 
respectively. However, a value added tax of 17 percent was levied on groundnut oil.  
Argentina’s groundnut trade policy contrasts sharply with that of India and China, as 
almost all the distortions are associated with exports. Until 2001, exports of raw groundnuts were 
taxed at 3.5 percent while exports of processed products were not taxed. However, as a result of 
Argentina’s recent financial crisis, export retention on groundnuts increased to 20 percent. This 
                                                                  
3According to FAO, these policies provide little incentive to expand production due to unattractive administrative price levels and 
greater involvement of private sector in marketing operations. Data on the size of domestic support is not available.  
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export tax may countervail the positive signal sent to groundnut exporter through the devaluation 
of peso. Argentina has import tariffs on groundnuts and products, which exhibit some tariff 
escalation (5, 8 and 13 percent on groundnuts, cake, and oil). These tariffs are redundant since 
the country is a net exporter of groundnuts products. 
Groundnut policies in key African exporters  
After decades of extensive intervention in the groundnut sector, African countries have, to a 
varying degree, undergone market reforms in the 1980s under structural adjustment plans. One 
of the main objectives of market reforms was to eliminate direct and indirect taxation of farmers 
that had undermined production incentives in the 1970s and early 1980s and led to excess 
processing capacities in many groundnut producing countries (Badiane and Kinteh). The reforms 
have however generally been piecemeal and partial. Governments have generally withdrawn 
from input markets, which, due to important market failures (e.g., in credit market) and high 
transaction costs led to difficult access to credit to purchase certified seeds and fertilizer. 
(Governments have however been more reluctant to liberalize groundnut processing, for which 
privatization efforts started only recently (Senegal, Gambia).  
African governments have traditionally used pricing policies as levers to conveniently tax 
or subsidize farmers based on countries’ industrial policy and political circumstances. Taxation 
of groundnut farmers was high in the 1970s but has been reversed since the early 1990s in most 
countries when world prices espoused a declining trend (Badiane and Kinteh 1994).
 4 In Senegal 
and Gambia, the main rationale for state intervention in the groundnut sector has been to 
safeguard the viability of state-owned processing mills. Consequently, the share of groundnut 
farmers in the export price has consistently been lower than 60 percent in these two countries  
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(Badiane and Gaye). This policy has been counter-productive, since it has led farmers to bypass 
large public processing companies, leading to increased excess capacities and financial 
difficulties.  
With regard to trade policies, there are wide differences among African traditional 
groundnut exporters. Senegal and Malawi apply tariffs to processed groundnuts, to encourage in-
country processing of groundnuts (oil production in the case of Senegal). In contrast, Gambia has 
a liberal trade policy, with no export taxes or import tariffs. South African tariff structure 
exhibits a slight escalation, with processed groundnuts subject to a tariff of 6 percent while 
unprocessed groundnuts enter duty free. In Senegal and Gambia however, unofficial cross border 
trade is significant, with farmers frequently crossing the border to and from Senegal, depending 
mainly on respective producer prices and domestic supply levels. 
Trade Barriers in Major High-Income Groundnut Importers 
 In spite of a general pattern of moderate tariff escalation, tariff barriers for groundnuts are not a 
major obstacle in high-income major importers: the two largest groundnuts importers in this 
category, the EU and Canada, have a zero tariff for unprocessed groundnut and low processed 
groundnut tariffs for GSP and LDC countries. Assessment of market access in these countries 
should however take into account the strict quality standards and SPS regulations (Otsuki, 
Wilson, and Sewadeh). In contrast to the EU and Canada, Japan and especially Korea have a 
higher tariff regime for groundnuts.  
 
III. The Groundnut Product Model 
This section draws extensively on Beghin and Matthey. We refer the interested reader to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
4Taxation of producers was direct, i.e., when marketing boards or similar agencies captured the rent equals to the difference 
between net world price and producer price, or indirect, via real exchange rate appreciation. This taxation was generally 
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latter paper, which provides a detailed and technical description of the model and its calibration. 
Groundnut markets  
Groundnut supply  
For exposition sake, we abstract from a country subscript when presenting the structure of the 
model. We make it clear whenever aggregation over countries is necessary. In each producing 
country, the aggregate supply of groundnuts, GS, is function of the current domestic price Pgavrg, 
the average of the domestic farmgate prices for food-groundnuts production, FGS, and crush-
groundnuts production, CGS, or Pgavrg = (CGS/GS)Pcg+(1-(CGS/GS))Pfg. A linear specification is 
chosen for the supply:  
(1)  GS = bgo+bg1 Pgavw = bgo+bg1[ (CGS/GS)Pcg+(FGS/GS)Pfg]. 
Share coefficients (CGS/GS), and (1-(CGS/GS)), are endogenous and reflect the composition of 
aggregate output. Estimates of parameters bg come from the econometric or consensus estimates 
of supply elasticities depending on availability. This convoluted approach to modeling the 
aggregate supply decision is motivated by the lack of data on individual land allocation and yield 
for the two types of groundnuts in most countries. This approach mimics two separate production 
decisions for which individual data are not available and which are “revealed” at harvest time. It 
is clear that if the price of food-quality groundnut rises relative to the price of crush-quality 
groundnuts, then farmers will exert more effort to increase the average quality of their crop 
resulting in a larger share of food-quality groundnuts in their aggregate groundnut crop.  
  We explain next how domestic price Pfg is determined. The farmgate price of food-
groundnuts is function of the world price of food groundnuts expressed in local currency, Pgw, 
inclusive of distortions affecting the producer at the farm gate level, τg, and transaction cost 
affecting the farmgate price from the border, tcg. The domestic producer price for food 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
mitigated by input subsidies and border protection.   
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groundnuts is Pfg = ψ (Pgw+ τg )+ tcg. Parameter ψ represents a price transmission/pass-through 
scalar. If ψ = 1 then full transmission is assumed. We use values between 0.4 and 1 for this 
parameter in the simulations. The imperfect pass-through of world prices to domestic markets is 
consistent with quality differential across countries, since the world price (so-called Rotterdam 
Price) corresponds to the best available quality worldwide. 
The crush-quality groundnut price is determined by the domestic equilibrium for crush-
quality groundnuts, since the latter are treated as a nontraded good market. Domestic supply 
satisfies the crush-quality groundnut demand. Relative to crush-quality, food-quality groundnuts 
receive a quality premium. This price premium is endogenous and driven by cost to reflect the 
relative marginal cost of food-quality groundnuts.  
 Price  Pgw is determined by the equilibrium of the world market for food-groundnuts. 
Price Pcg is determined by the domestic market equilibrium for crush-groundnuts (demand = 
supply) as it is considered a nontraded good. The demand for crush-groundnuts is explained 
below.  
  The change in welfare of groundnut producers is measured by the change in realized 
quasi- profit, from the initial situation reflecting the current distorted prices to a set of new 
prices. This welfare measure is:  
(2) ∆Πp = ∫





GS(Pgavrg ) dPgavrg.  
where superscripts 0 and 1 indicate old and new situations.  
Total crush-quality groundnut demand  
The total demand for crush-quality groundnuts, TGCD, is a sum of demands coming from seed 
use, GSEED, and crushing industry, GCD: 
(3)  TGCD = GSEED+ GCD.  
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Seed demand The seed demand is assumed to be driven by price of groundnuts and the expected 
production requirement for the year, which for simplicity is assumed to be equal to the actual 
output for the year. Hence, we assume instantaneous adjustment of seed demand to concurrent 
production changes. We also assume that the seed demand reflects a pure agronomic constraint 
and we do not consider substitution with other inputs in groundnut production: 
(4) GSEED  =  αs0 + αs1GS+ αs2Pcg ,  
with αs0 denoting the intercept, αs1 denoting the seed requirement per unit of output, and αs1 
denoting the price response of seed demand.  
Crush demand The crush demand is driven by groundnut oil demand and/or by cake demand. 
Given the joint product of oil and cake and the positive economic value attached to cake, the 
derived demand from crushing reflects both groundnut oil and its byproduct cake. The derived 
demand for crush groundnuts is driven by the crush margin, bcrush:  
(5)  GCD = GCD( bcrush ) with bcrush = γoilPo + γcake Pcake-Pcg. 
Parameters γoil and γcake reflect the jointness of cake and oil in crushing (the oil and cake 
produced per unit of crushed groundnut). 
Food-quality groundnut demand 
Food-quality groundnut demand, GFD, represents a single aggregate food use representing 
several food items in groundnut-equivalent (prepared groundnuts, groundnut butter, candies, etc). 
The final demand for food-groundnuts is part of an incomplete final demand system for food-
groundnuts and groundnut oil, and an aggregate other goods based on the calibrated Linquad 
demand system (LaFrance; Beghin Bureau, and Drogué).
5 The system explains final 
consumption decisions for the two groundnut goods as determined by corresponding prices 
                                                                  
5Some other oils could be easily added to the demand system, if ever an expanded investigation covered other oils (soy, 
sunflower, and rapeseed oils).   
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described in a vector Ppg, Ppg = (Pgg, Po), and income, M. The demand is  
(6) GFD  =  GFD(Pgg, Po, Pz, M).  
Pz describes the price of an aggregate representing all-other goods. The parameterization of GFD 
with the Linquad demand system is explained below in the section dedicated to the final 
consumer. The consumer price Pgg is the world price of food-groundnuts inclusive of distortions, 
dgg, affecting consumers and a price wedge dictated by transaction cost, tcg. A net importer status 
would imply an additional transportation margin, atg, and Pgg = Pgw+dgg + tcg + atg in the latter 
case. 
Groundnuts domestic market equilibrium  
The crush-groundnut domestic market equilibrium is reached when the supply and demand for 
crush groundnuts are set equal, or TGCD = CGS.  
For food groundnuts, the domestic equilibrium is reached with trade: 
(7) GFD-FGS  =  FGnetrade. 
Net trade, FGnetrade, could be either imports or exports. 
Food-groundnuts world market equilibrium 
The sum of excess demands over all countries is equal to zero and determines the world price for 
food-quality groundnuts.  
The crushing industry  
Oil and meal production
6  
We make the usual assumptions of fixed proportion in the jointness of cake and oil production, 
and price-taking in oilseed crushing. As the crush margin increases, the demand for crush 
groundnuts increases. Market equilibrium between the horizontal supply of oil and cake and their 
respective market demands is such that equation (8) is satisfied. If the marginal cost were higher  
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than the marginal price, a decrease in quantity of groundnuts crushed would induce a joint 
movement along the demands for oil and cake to match the new production levels of oil and 
cake, and increase the industry price of oil and cakes re-establishing equilibrium. 
  The oil supply, GOS, and the cake supply, CakeS, are GOS = γoilGCD, and CakeS = γcake 
GCD. The welfare of the crusher is just the quasi profit from crushing. The change in welfare 
between two policy regimes is just the difference in profits between the two states of the world: 
(8)  ∆Πcrush = GCD
1( b
1
crush ) – GCD
0( b
0
crush ),  
where margin b
i
crush is evaluated at prices prevailing in period i. 
Groundnut oil demand  
Groundnut oil demand is a final demand coming from the consumer. Groundnut oil is one of two 
groundnut goods the final consumer purchases as explained above in the section on food-
groundnut demand. The oil demand is structured similarly as the demand for prepared 
groundnuts is: 
(9)  GOD = GOD(Pgg, Po, Pz, M).  
The calibration of GOD is explained in the section on the final consumer. 
Cake demand  
It is a derived demand from livestock production. Cake or meal demand is an output-constant 
demand, which is function of livestock numbers (aggregate livestock animal units), LAU, the 
price of cakes and the price of other feed products, Pfeed. We assume that the animal unit numbers 
and prices of competing feed products are unaffected by the policy reform and abstract away 
from them in the policy scenario. The cake demand is 
(10)  CakeD = CakeD( Pcake, Pfeed, LAU). 
Oil and cake domestic market equilibrium  
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
6We use cake and meal as synonyms.  
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We assume trade in groundnut oil and cake is an excess demand/supply and provides closure in 
these markets: 
(11)  GOD-GOS = GOnetrade, and 
(12) CakeD-CakeS  =  Cakenetrade, 
with GOnetrade and Cakenetrade representing the country import from or export to the world 
market for the two products. The link between the world price in domestic currency and 
domestic price for these two products is done via a price transmission equation similarly to the 
food-groundnut price with scalars ψcake and ψoil. The equations are: 
(13) Pcake = ψcake (Pcakew+ τcake ) +tccake, and  
(14) Po = ψoil (Pow + τo) + tco ,  
with parameters tc and τ representing price wedge for transaction costs, and distortions. 
Oil and cake world market equilibrium 
The sum of excess demand over all countries is equal to zero and determines the world price for 
oil and cakes, which are traded commodities in the model and for which systematic trade data 
exist. 
Treatment and calibration of final consumption  
We follow the demand calibration approach of Beghin, Bureau, and Drogué. We have a 
representative consumer with expenditure function e(P, U) with P being the vector of relevant 
consumer prices, and with U denoting utility. We are interested in a vector of two groundnut-
containing goods GGD = (GFD, GOD), that is prepared groundnuts, and groundnut oil, with 
prices Ppg = (Pgg, Po). We have the aggregate other goods, Z, for completeness with price Pz. The 
approach allows us to derive an exact welfare measure from an incomplete demand system. The 
price vector P is be decomposed into P = (Pgg, Po, Pz), and income is denoted by M, with 
subscripts indicating the respective commodities. The Linquad expression of the vector of  
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Marshallian demands for agricultural and food goods is:  
(15)  GGD
M = ε + V Ppg + χ (M- ε’Ppg- 1/2Ppg
’V Ppg - δ(pz)), 
corresponding to the expenditure function 
(16) e(Ppg, pz, θ) = Ppg’ε +  1
2 Ppg’V Ppg + δ(pz)+ θ(Pz, u)e
χ’Ppg.  
The elements of vectors, ε, and χ, in equations (15) and (16), together with the elements of 
matrix V are calibrated using a procedure described in detail in Beghin, Bureau, and Drogué.  
Welfare analysis 
Consumer  
Equations (15 ) and (16 ) lead to an equivalent variation, EV, equal to  
(17) EV  =  [M– ε’P
1








pg ] – [M – ε’P
0




pg ].   
We compute the change in expenditure, which would keep utility at the free trade utility level 
under the distorted program prices. Superscripts 0 and 1 denote initial distorted and final free-
trade prices.  
Taxpayers 
With policy reforms, there is a potential change in tax revenues food-groundnut, oil, and cake 
trade. These losses are captured by the accounting identity (new flow*new tax rates*new prices- 
old flows*old tax rates*old prices).  
Net welfare gains from policy reform 
Net welfare is defines as the EV of the consumer net of losses/gains to groundnut producers, 
changes in livestock producers’ surplus, changes in profits in crushing, and gains (losses) for 
taxpayers. 
 
IV. Calibration and Policy Scenarios 
Calibration  
 18  
 
The country coverage includes Argentina, Canada, China, EU-15, the Gambia, India, Malawi, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, the United States, and an aggregate Rest of World. 
Commodity coverage includes four commodities: food-quality groundnuts crush quality 
groundnuts, groundnut oil, and groundnut cakes.  
The typical groundnut quality premium is such that Pcg is between 40 and 50 percent of 
Pfg. As more food groundnuts are produced relative to crush groundnuts, the premium for food 
groundnuts increases to reflect the higher relative marginal cost of food-quality groundnuts. We 
calibrate the two prices as follows: Pcg = Pfg (0.42+0.05 CGS/GS)), which reflects the stylized 
facts of the two prices’ relationship. 
We calibrate the model for 3 years (1999/2000, 2000/01, and 2001/02) on historical data 
using MS Excel. Then the impact of policy scenarios is measured in deviation from the historical 
baseline expressed in 1995 constant U.S. dollars. We use USDA-FAS Production, Supply, and 
Distribution (PS&D) data to calibrate production, utilization, and trade of groundnuts and 
products. The latter dataset is completed by FAO data whenever USDA-FAS PS&D is not 
available. The macro data (GDP, GDP deflator, exchange rate) come from the IMF-International 
Financial statistics and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. The baseline 
and simulations were run for 3 years (1999-2001) and averaged out.  
The policy instrument coverage in the analysis reflects the current (2002) level of trade 
and domestic policies presented in the policy section of the paper. The policy coverage allows 
for the analysis of the separate impact of border measures on groundnuts, oil, and cake in all 
countries, their combined effects, and domestic policy such as the new U.S. peanut policy. Table 
1 presents the parameterized policy instruments by country. The coverage of border measures is 
extensive. The coverage of domestic distortions (farm support, other taxes/subsidies) is spottier  
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despite a long search. Domestic distortions are documented for OECD countries but are harder to 
collect for developing economies, especially when parastatals are involved in marketing and 
trade. We cover the major features of the 2002 U.S. farm bill on peanuts (loan rate and counter-
cyclical payments based on target price). Trade protection in the United States is high but not 
effective since preferential imports of peanuts could enter at zero tariffs and the current TRQ is 
under-filled. The United States is a low-cost net exporter of peanuts and products. Hence, the 
high tariffs on out-of-quota peanut imports are not effective.  
Domestic price wedges such as value-added taxes is available for a few countries (e.g., 
China), but not systematically covered. India and China have the highest protection levels 
including a strong protection of value-added activities. Given the strong governmental presence 
in groundnut markets in these two countries, it is hard to know exactly what protection levels are 
provided to farmers. Some African countries have some border protection on oil and prepared 
groundnuts product to protect their domestic value-added activities.  
The various supply and demand elasticities used in the model are detailed in Beghin and 
Matthey. Most of the elasticities come from the FAPRI elasticity database and are a combination 
of econometric and consensus estimates. Both demand and supply are price-inelastic. Income 
elasticities are positive but smaller than one. 
Policy reform scenarios  
We analyze multiple scenarios. First, we consider full multilateral trade liberalization for 
groundnuts, cake, and oil, with and without the removal of the U.S. peanut program. We label 
these two scenarios FMTL&US, and FMTL. Then we consider multilateral groundnut trade 
liberalization, again with and without the removal of the U.S. farm peanut program (GMTL&US, 
and GMTL scenarios); Then we consider full trade liberalization in the two largest and most 
distorted groundnut markets, China and India (CIFTL scenario). We report results on these five  
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key scenarios in Tables 3 to 7. All results regarding changes in price and physical flows are 
reported in percent change from the baseline. Changes in welfare are reported in 1995 PPP U.S. 
dollars (purchase power parity holding in 1995) in Table 8. The simulations were run for the 3 
years (1999-2001) and averaged out. We report the impact in levels and then in proportional 
changes (3-year average of proportional impacts) in the last column of Tables 2 to 6. 
 
V. Results 
The two full trade liberalization with and without the removal of U.S. farm policy, FMTL&US 
and FMTL, bring strong price increases for all three products, 19 percent for groundnuts, 18 
percent for groundnut cake, and 16 percent for groundnut oil, as shown in Tables 2 and 3. For the 
large protectionist countries (China, India), the net effect the groundnut price increase and 
removal of protection is beneficial to final users of groundnuts, other things being equal. 
Groundnut imports expand in these countries. For countries with moderate or no protection prior 
to reform, the net impact (tariff removal and terms of trade) is an increase in domestic prices of 
food and crush groundnuts handicapping groundnut users (final consumers, crushers). These 
substantial terms of trade effects have a large impact on trade and complicate the welfare impact 
of the reforms since allocative efficiency gains can be offset by large price increases originating 
in the post-reform world markets. 
This welfare impact of the FMTL&US and FMTL reforms is further influenced by the 
change in the groundnut oil price, which affects the crush margin. In countries with high 
protection of the oil and/or meal sectors (e.g., India), the oil and cake tariff removal, net of the 
world price hike, induces lower domestic prices for these two products and reduces crush 
margins. As a result of the lower crush margin, the domestic excess demand for oil and cake 
increases (reduced crush, larger local demand for products).   
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By contrast, countries with moderate or no protection in their oil (and cake) market face a 
net price increase for oil (and cake) after full trade liberalization. Their final consumption of 
these value-added products decreases, and crushing increases as their crush margin improves 
with the reform. Specifically, crush margins deteriorate in the EU, India, Malawi, Senegal, and 
the United States. However, margins improve in China, Gambia, Nigeria, and South Africa. 
Countries facing deteriorating margins but which have a competitive groundnut production 
expand their production and exports of groundnuts (e.g., Senegal, the United States) but reduce 
their exports of processed products.  
As shown in Tables 2 and 3, trade patterns change dramatically, China and India 
experienced trade reversal becoming large importers of groundnuts. Further, India becomes a 
large importer of cake and oil, because of the lower domestic price in these sectors and reduced 
crush. The first two columns of Table 7 show the welfare impact of these two reforms. The 
aggregate net welfare effects of FMTL&US and FMTL amount to about 562 and 559 million 
dollars at 1995 prices, respectively. China and India experience the largest welfare gains, not 
surprisingly since they have the two most distorted groundnut product markets. China’s welfare 
gains are about 361 million dollars, whereas India’s’ gains are about 147 million dollars. The 
“moderate” world welfare effect first comes from offsets (some countries gain in national 
welfare, whereas some others lose, chiefly the EU-15). Further, for many countries besides 
China and India, individual net gains/losses are moderate, mostly because of the small size of the 
three markets and their price-inelastic nature, which bring large transfers but small deadweight 
losses. Indeed, substantial transfers occur between consumers, crushers, and producers. These 
transfers offset each other.  
Price effects induced by the reforms have a similar impact (large welfare rectangles and 
small triangles), including in countries with undistorted markets. For example in Nigeria,  
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following FMTL, groundnut producers gain 75 million dollars of quasi-rents; consumers 
experience welfare losses of 70 million dollars because of higher oil and processed groundnut 
prices; crushers gain 20 million dollars; meal users (feed users) lose about 4 million dollars. The 
country in aggregate is better off by 22 million dollars.  
Under multilateral trade liberalization for all three products, the removal of the U.S. 
program does not matter much in terms of its impact on trade flows, terms of trade or welfare. 
This result hinges on the fact that the price floor established by the U.S. loan rate is not effective 
because of the strong price effects of trade liberalization. The only remaining production 
distorting element is the fixed payment (fully coupled in our model), which is small. Results 
under both scenarios (full trade liberalization (FMTL), and FMTL&US) are qualitatively 
identical, except for the United States, which experience additional welfare gains of 5 million 
dollars for the removal of its domestic distortions (gains to U.S. taxpayers net of losses of U.S. 
producers). 
The world price impacts of the FMTL scenario are identical to those of FMTL&US (19 , 
18and 16 percent respectively for groundnuts, cake and oil). Similarly trade flows are barely 
affected by the removal of the U.S. domestic program under free trade. U.S. peanut exports are 
about 11,000 metric tons lower in the FMTL&US scenario as compared to their level in the 
FMTL scenario. Given that our parameterization of U.S. farm policy assumes full coupling of 
payments received by producers to production, our assessment provides an upper bound on the 
effect of the current U.S. peanut program.
7 
Many debates of the Doha round of the WTO evolve around narrow agricultural 
                                                                  
7We also ran a U.S. distortion removal scenario under existing trade distortions. We obtain a 0.13% increase in the world price of 
groundnuts and virtually no increase in world cake and oil prices. U.S. peanut exports decrease by 10 percent or about 20,000 mt. 
Hence unlike in the case of some other commodities subsidized by U.S. taxpayers and consumers (e.g., rice, cotton, sugar), the 
impact of the current U.S. farm program on groundnut world price and trade is nearly negligible.  
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negotiations. Hence, it is useful to assess what a narrow agricultural liberalization would achieve 
relative to a full trade liberalization encompassing value-added products (oil and cake). The 
GMTL&US, and GMTL scenarios consider this type of reform and their impacts are shown in 
Tables 4 and 5 and in the third and fourth columns of Table 7. Much is achieved by groundnut 
trade liberalization alone, but with a large second best component since distortions are present in 
the value-added markets. In these groundnut liberalization scenarios, the price of cake and oil is 
hardly affected and crush margins are primarily affected by changes in groundnut prices. 
Margins improve in India and China, but deteriorate in countries with no or small oil and cake 
distortions. Consumer welfare implications are also different in these groundnut trade scenarios. 
In highly protected oil markets, oil prices are higher under the groundnut trade scenarios (GMTL 
scenarios) than they would be under all-product trade liberalization (FMTL scenarios). In 
countries with no oil distortions, prices roughly remain as their baseline level and consumers do 
better under the groundnut trade liberalization than under FMTL scenarios. For the latter reason, 
the Rest of the World fares much better under GMTL scenarios than under the FMTL scenarios.  
By contrast African economies do much better with the FMTL scenarios than they would 
do with groundnut trade liberalization reforms. The potential Africa-5 welfare gains double 
moving from GMTL scenarios to FMTL ones.
8 
If China and India liberalized alone (CIFTL scenario), the qualitative results of the FMTL 
scenarios would hold. What is striking in this last scenario is the importance of China and India’s 
distortions in the welfare, trade, and price effects. As suggested by Table 6 and the last column 
of Table 7, FMTL really hinges on the removal of distortions in China and India. With the 
implementation of CIFTL, world price increases for the three products would be substantial: 
nearly 17 percent for groundnuts, 18 percent for meal, and 16 percent for groundnut oil. The  
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major welfare differences occur in the Rest of the world where consumers do worse than they 
would under the GMTL, since oil prices are higher but better than under FMTL since groundnut 
prices are not as high in the CIFTL scenario as they are in the FMTL one. Africa-5 improves its 
lot in aggregate but not as well as it would under the FMTL scenario, since groundnut prices are 
not as high and because Africa-5 own distortions are still in place. 
 
VI. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
The groundnut market has been historically distorted by heavy government intervention in the 
United States, the only country in the North with a large stake in groundnut markets (Rucker and 
Thurman). The new U.S. Farm Bill has suppressed many if not most unsustainable features of 
the previous farm legislations, but has introduced new distortions with potential to depress world 
market prices and subsidizing U.S. groundnut exports. However, we find that the current U.S. 
domestic peanut program is now mostly a U.S. domestic issue, unlike U.S. domestic policy for 
other products (e.g., dairy, rice, cotton, sugar). The distortion of groundnut product markets is 
essentially a South-South affaire and debate. The remaining tariffs in the United States are high 
but redundant because the country is a net competitive exporter of high- quality groundnuts. 
Developing members would gain little by “forcing” further U.S. domestic policy reform 
unless groundnut prices fall to very low levels. Then the U.S. policy would further destabilize 
world prices given its anti-cyclical nature. U.S. producers actually would benefit from 
multilateral trade liberalization in groundnuts product markets. Hence on this very instance of 
groundnuts, free traders in the South have a natural ally in the North just on mercantilist 
reasoning. 
  China and India have become more prominent protectionist forces in groundnut markets. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
8 Africa-5 denotes our aggregate of the Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa.  
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India has a long track record in agricultural distortions and closed borders. China made major 
concessions under the terms of accession to the WTO, but keeps subsidizing domestic valued- 
added activities, such as crushing, in one way or another. In India and China governments have 
succeeded in stimulating production and export and capturing a growing share in the 
international market at the cost of major distortions in world markets and at home.  
The large distortions introduced by these countries depress world market prices and 
impose large welfare losses on themselves. Worse, they impose sizeable welfare and agricultural 
income losses among smaller producing and exporting countries, mainly in Africa, hence our 
title. The removal of trade distortions by the two largest developing economies (China and India) 
is essential for a successful reform of groundnut products markets.  
Following multilateral trade liberalization, net buyers of edible groundnuts, groundnut oil 
and groundnut meal will be worse off but as we show, the poorest countries present in these 
markets would mostly gain from full trade liberalization. Although net world welfare effects of 
liberalizing these three markets are moderate, they are still significant for small agrarian 
economies such as Malawi, Senegal, and Gambia. Hence in the context of poverty alleviation 
liberalizing these markets would induce sizeable welfare gains in these countries.  
As a block, the OECD countries would experience welfare losses after full trade 
liberalization (moderate gains in the United States offset by consumer losses in the EU-15, 
Canada and Mexico). Mexico, Canada, and the EU-15 lose from the trade liberalization, because 
they have limited distortions in these markets and are penalized by the price increases for the 
three products.  
In the two large developing economies (China and India) gains to consumers are partially 
offset by losses to producers under full trade liberalization. Yet, net buyers of groundnut 
products would be unambiguously better off in these two countries. Groundnuts and groundnut  
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oil are generally not central staple commodities such as rice, except in a few countries or regions. 
For example, groundnut oil is the main vegetable oil in southern China. In these few regions, 
consumer welfare gains would be more significant as we show that these transfers are large in 
the latter country and India. 
The simulations also show that beyond, agricultural trade liberalization, the liberalization 
of the value-added markets is essential to achieve larger welfare gains in African countries. 
Although the bulk of the world welfare gains occur with groundnut trade liberalization, the 
additional removal of distortions in value-added markets doubles net welfare gains in the African 
region via larger profits to groundnut producers, crushers, and exporters.  
African countries modeled in our trade liberalization analysis (The Gambia, Malawi, 
Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa) would experience aggregate welfare gains of 72 million 
dollars with Senegal and Nigeria reaping most of these gains. Groundnut and groundnut oil 
consumers in Africa, tend to be urban whereas groundnut production generates income in rural 
areas as a cash crop. In that respect, African farmers modeled in our analysis gain about 124 
million dollars of profits. These figures are significant in the context of small African economies, 
but do not represent a silver bullet to lift the rural sector in these countries. The Rest of the 
World fares much worse in the full trade liberalization scenarios (FMTL and FMTL&US) 
relative to groundnut trade liberalization, because its consumers are penalized by the higher price 
for groundnut oil induced by the former scenarios.  
Identifying globally superior policy options is not difficult. However, the feasibility of 
reforms depends on the power of vested interests and the ability of governments to identify 
tradeoffs and politically feasible packages that will allow them to continue to pursue multiple 
goals in a more efficient manner. Based on our analysis, acceptable concessions could be struck 
for African members to benefit from liberalization of markets such as groundnuts and cotton, in  
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order to mitigate the withering of preferential treatments. For China and India, concessions on 
groundnuts could be offset by potential mercantilist gains in other agricultural markets (e.g., rice, 
or dairy), or other sectors such as services and manufacturing.  
Our quantitative assessment has some limitations and abstracted from important 
problems. African producers need to reduce their export volatility through better water control 
(less dependence on rainfall) and higher efficiency in processing if they are to become 
dependable exporters in the context of global markets. Another limitation is that our modeling 
exercise did not address the cost of upgrading groundnut quality. Most developing exporters, 
except Argentina, face a “quality” challenge for meeting the requirements of the expanding 
confectionary markets and SPS requirements in OECD markets, Major challenges include 
adapted research, with an emphasis on yield but also on size and flavor, better access to fertilizer 
and pesticides, and aflatoxin contamination control.  
 28  
References 
Adams, G., P. Westhoff, B. Willott, and R.E. Young II. (2001). “Do Decoupled Payments Affect 
U.S. Crop Area? Preliminary Evidence from 1997-2000,” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics Vol. 83 (2001): 1190-95. 
Akobundu E. “Farm-Household Analysis of Policies Affecting Groundnut production in 
Senegal.” MS Thesis, Virginia Polytechnic and State University, 1998. 
Anderson, K., J. Francois, T. Hertel, B. Hoekman, and W. Martin. “Potential gains from trade 
reform in the new millennium.” Paper presented at the Third Annual Conference on Global 
Economic Analysis, held at Monash University, June 2000. 
Badiane, O. and Kinteh, S. Trade Pessimism and regionalism in African Countries: The Case of 
Groundnut Exporters. IFPRI Research Report 97, May 1994. 
Badiane, O. and M. Gaye Liberalization of Groundnut Markets in Senegal: Impact on the 
Marketing and Processing Sector. IFPRI Research Report, 1999. 
Baffes, J. “Cotton Market Setting, Policies, Issues, and Facts,” mimeo, The World Bank, 
Washington DC, March 2003. 
Beghin, J., J-C. Bureau, and S. Drogué. “The Calibration of Incomplete Demand Systems in 
Quantitative Analysis.” CARD Working Paper 03-WP 324, Iowa State University, 
January 2003. 
Beghin, J., and H. Matthey. “Modeling World Peanut Product Markets: A Tool for Agricultural 
Trade Policy Analysis.” CARD Working Paper 03-WP 332, Iowa State University, May 
2003. 
Beghin J., D. Roland-Holst, and D. van der Mensbrugghe. “How will agricultural trade reforms 
in high-income countries affect the trading relationships of developing countries?” in 
Agriculture, Trade, and Poverty: Making Policy Analysis Count, OECD Publications, 
Paris, 2003: 39-57. 
Diop, N., J. Beghin, and M. Sewadeh. “Groundnut Policies, Global Trade Dynamics and the 
Impact of Trade Liberalization” mimeo, the World Bank, Washington DC, March 2003. 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The World Groundnut Economy Facts, Trends, and 
Outlook, 1999, Rome. 
LaFrance, J.T. “The LINQUAD Incomplete Demand Model.” Working Paper, Department of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 1998. 
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI). Elasticity database, Iowa State 
University, Ames Iowa. 
International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics, Miscellaneous, Washington DC. 
Hathie, I., and R.A. Lopez. “The Impact of Market Reforms on the Senegalese Peanut 
Economy,” Journal of International Development 5 (July 2002): 543-554. 
Kherallah, M., and K. Govindan. “The Sequencing of Agricultural Market Reforms in Malawi,” 
Journal of African Economies 8(2) (July 1999): 125-51. 
Otsuki, T., J.S. Wilson, and M. Sewadeh. “What Price Precaution? European Harmonisation of  
 29  
Aflatoxin Regulations and African Groundnut Exports,” European Review of 
Agricultural Economics 28(3), 2001: 263-83. 
Revoredo, C.L., and S. Fletcher. “The US 2002 Farm Act and the Effects on US Groundnut 
Exports”. University of Georgia, mimeo, 2002. 
Rucker, R. R. and W.N. Thurman, "The Economic Effects of Supply Controls: The Simple 
Analytics of the U.S. Peanut Program," Journal of Law and Economics 33 (1990): 483-
515. 
Skinner, R. “Issues Facing the U.S. Peanut Industry During the Seattle Round of the World 
Trade Organization.” US Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1999. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service's Production, Supply, and 
Distribution (PS&D), Washington DC. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. GAIN Reports, Oilseeds and Products Attaché Reports, various 
issues, Washington DC. 
The World Bank. World Development Indicators, Washington DC. 
  
 31
Table 1 . Current trade and domestic policy parameters used in the model
country commodity description unit 99/00 00/01 0 1 /02
ARGENTINA Peanut Export tax % of border price  3.5% 3.5% 3.5%
ARGENTINA Peanut M eal Export rebate % 3.2% 3.2% 3.2%
ARGENTINA Peanut Oil Export rebate % 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
EU-15 (European Union) Peanut Oil Import Tariff % 6.4% 6.4% 6.4%
EU-15 (European Union) Peanut Oil import subsidy for oil from Senegal  % 10.0% 10.0% 10.0%
CHINA Peanut Import Tariff % 30.0% 30.0% 30.0%
CHINA Peanut Value Added Tax % 17.0% 17.0% 17.0%
CHINA Peanut M eal Tariff % 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
CHINA Peanut Oil Tariff % 9.7% 9.7% 9.7%
CHINA Peanut Oil Value Added Tax % 17.0% 17.0% 17.0%
INDIA Peanut Tariff % 45.0% 45.0% 45.0%
INDIA Peanut Meal Tariff % 45.0% 45.0% 45.0%
INDIA Peanut Oil Tariff refined oil % 35.0% 35.0% 35.0%
REST OF W ORLD  Peanut Tariff % 5.4% 5.4% 5.4%
REST OF W ORLD  Peanut M eal Tariff % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
REST OF WORLD  Peanut Oil Tariff % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
CANADA Peanut Tariff % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
M EXICO Peanut Tariff % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
SENEGAL Peanut Tariff % 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
SENEGAL Peanut Tariff on processed % 20.0% 20.0% 20.0%
SENEGAL peanut m eal Tariff % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
SENEGAL Peanut Oil Tariff refined oil % 20.0% 20.0% 20.0%
NIGERIA Peanut Tariff % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
NIGERIA Peanut M eal Tariff % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
NIGERIA Peanut Oil Tariff refined oil % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH  AFRICA Peanut  Tariff % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH  AFRICA Peanut  Tariff processed peanut food % 6.0% 6.0% 6.0%
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH  AFRICA Peanut M eal Tariff % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH  AFRICA Peanut Oil Tariff refined oil % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
M ALAW I Peanut Tariff % 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
MALAWI Peanut Tariff processed  for consumption % 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%
M ALAW I Peanut M eal Tariff % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
MALAWI Peanut Oil Tariff refined oil % 20.0% 20.0% 20.0%
GAMBIA Peanut Tariff % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
GAM BIA Peanut M eal Tariff % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
GAMBIA Peanut Oil Tariff refined oil % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
USA peanuts Out-of-quota tariffs
USA peanuts    shelled out-of-quota tariffs % 140% 136% 132%
USA peanuts    in-shell out-of-quota tariffs % 173% 169% 164%
USA peanuts    duty-free imports from Mexico 1000 mt 3.9 4.0 4.2
USA peanuts Mexico above-quota tariffs
USA peanuts     shelled peanuts (port price<652$/mt) $/mt 685.1 665.6 591.6
USA peanuts    shelled peanuts (port price>652$/mt) % 105% 102% 99%
USA peanuts     in-shell peanuts (port price<284$/mt) $/mt 452.4 439.5 390.6
USA peanuts     in-shell peanuts (port price>284$/mt) % 159% 154% 150%
USA peanuts GATT Schedule of US Peanut Imports (shelled basis)
USA peanuts    Argentina 1000 mt 43.9 43.9 43.9
USA peanuts    Mexico 1000 mt 3.9 4.0 4.2
USA peanuts    Others 1000 mt 9.0 9.0 9.0
USA peanuts    Total TRQ 1000 mt 56.8 56.9 57.1
USA peanuts Dom estic Target Price $/lb 0.2475 0.2475 0.2475
USA peanuts Domestic producer price at qualibration $/lb 0.254 0.274 0.234
USA peanuts Domestic Fixed Payment (fully coupled) $/lb 0.018 0.018 0.018
USA peanuts Domestic loan Rate scaled up 1.1 for annual average $/lb 0.1775 0.1775 0.1775
U S A P e a n u t  m e a l T a r i f f % 0 %0 %0 %
USA Peanut oil Tariff % 0% 0% 0%   
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Table 2. Full trade liberalization and removal of US farm policy (FMTL&US scenario)
new levels after reform baseline levels average change
99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 for 3 years
Peanuts Trade (1000mt)
Net Exporters
Argentina 281 227 271 226 177 185 33%
China -236 -363 -124 540 450 525 -149%
Gambia 13 18 20 8 11 15 55%
India -88 -140 -74 100 100 125 -196%
M a l a w i 5652339 5 %
Nigeria 127 145 145 0 0 0 13900%
S e n e g a l 5 24 83 3 2 4 51 3 9 0 %
South Africa 33 26 41 20 16 35 47%
USA 449 333 365 255 141 231 90%
Total Net Exports 636 299 682 1153 902 1124 -50%
Net Importers
Canada 106 96 102 116 107 110 -9%
European Union 420 409 434 457 441 463 -7%
Mexico 88 58 64 101 72 75 -16%
Rest of the World -167 -273 21 290 272 415 -151%
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0%
Total Net Imports 636 299 682 1153 902 1124 -50%
Peanuts Price US Run. 40/50 CIF Rotterda 971 1058 834 820 888 700 19%
Peanut Meal Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
A r g e n t i n a 6 84 95 26 75 05 2 0 %
China 165 182 175 9 15 25 1149%
Gambia 6 11 11 5 10 10 15%
India -210 -199 -127 10 20 100 -1174%
M a l a w i 000000 - 1 6 %
N i g e r i a 1 92 02 5 0 0 02 1 3 8 %
Senegal 128 141 138 130 144 140 -2%
South Africa -4 2 1 -5 0 0 107%
USA -5 -12 -2 6 5 5 -218%
R e s t  o f  t h e  W o r l d 4 14 02 6 8 1 4- 1 29 3 %
Total Net Exports 208 235 301 230 258 320 -8%
Net Importers
European Union 164 171 159 186 194 178 -11%
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0%
Total Net Imports 208 235 301 230 258 320 -8%
Meal Price 48/50% CIF Rotterdam $/mt 144 159 148 122 134 125 18%
Peanut Oil Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
A r g e n t i n a 4 64 04 34 64 14 2 0 %
C h i n a 6 37 46 8 0 5 23 6 7 3 %
G a m b i a 334000 3 4 3 %
India -87 -74 -105 0 0 0 -8863%
M a l a w i 000000 - 2 9 %
N i g e r i a 5 55 45 43 53 53 0 6 4 %
Senegal 93 97 106 98 102 109 -4%
S o u t h  A f r i c a 111000 1 2 9 %
USA -9 -49 -20 2 -30 -10 -126%
R e s t  o f  t h e  W o r l d 2 81 42 61 81 1 8 1 0 4 %
Total Net Exports 193 161 177 199 164 181 -2%
Net Importers
European Union 144 107 116 150 110 120 -3%
R e s i d u a l 4 95 46 14 95 46 1 0 %
Total Net Imports 193 161 177 199 164 181 -2%
Peanut Oil Price CIF Rotterdam $/mt 862 800 772 744 685 659 17%
welfare(million dollars) 532 652 502 562   
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Table 3. Full trade liberalization (FMTL scenario)
new levels after reform baseline levels
99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 average change
for 3 years (%)
Peanuts Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
Argentina 281 227 270 226 177 185 33%
China -240 -365 -132 540 450 525 -150%
Gambia 13 18 20 8 11 15 55%
India -89 -140 -78 100 100 125 -197%
M a l a w i 565233 9 4 %
Nigeria 127 145 143 0 0 0 13826%
S e n e g a l 5 24 83 3 2 4 5 1 3 8 2 %
South Africa 33 26 41 20 16 35 47%
USA 459 336 386 255 141 231 95%
Total Net Exports 640 300 690 1153 902 1124 -50%
Net Importers
Canada 106 96 102 116 107 110 -9%
European Union 420 409 434 457 441 463 -7%
Mexico 88 58 64 101 72 75 -16%
Rest of the World -163 -272 28 290 272 415 -150%
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0%
Total Net Imports 640 300 690 1153 902 1124 -50%
Peanuts Price US Run. 40/50, CIF Rott 970 1058 833 820 888 700 19%
Peanut Meal Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
A r g e n t i n a 6 84 95 26 75 05 20 %
China 165 182 175 9 15 25 1148%
Gambia 6 11 11 5 10 10 15%
India -210 -199 -127 10 20 100 -1174%
M a l a w i 000000 - 1 7 %
Nigeria 19 20 25 0 0 0 2135%
Senegal 128 141 138 130 144 140 -2%
South Africa -4 2 1 -5 0 0 107%
USA -5 -12 -2 6 5 5 -216%
Rest of the World 41 40 27 8 14 -12 93%
Total Net Exports 208 235 301 230 258 320 -8%
Net Importers
European Union 164 171 159 186 194 178 -11%
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0%
Total Net Imports 208 235 301 230 258 320 -8%
Meal Price 48/50% CIF Rotterdam $/m 144 159 148 122 134 125 18%
Peanut Oil Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
A r g e n t i n a 4 64 04 34 64 14 20 %
C h i n a 6 37 46 8 0 5 2 3 6 6 6 %
G a m b i a 334000 3 4 2 %
India -87 -74 -105 0 0 0 -8876%
M a l a w i 000000 - 2 9 %
N i g e r i a 5 55 45 43 53 53 06 4 %
Senegal 93 97 106 98 102 109 -4%
S o u t h  A f r i c a 111000 1 2 8 %
USA -9 -49 -20 2 -30 -10 -125%
R e s t  o f  t h e  W o r l d 2 81 42 71 81 1 81 0 6 %
Total Net Exports 193 161 177 199 164 181 -2%
Net Importers
European Union 144 107 116 150 110 120 -3%
R e s i d u a l 4 95 46 14 95 46 10 %
Total Net Imports 193 161 177 199 164 181 -2%
Peanut Oil Price CIF Rotterdam $/mt 861 800 772 744 685 659 17%
welfare(million dollars) 531 653 494 559   
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Table 4. Peanut trade liberalization and removal of US peanut program (GMTL&US scenario)
new levels after reform baseline levels
99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 average change
for 3 years
Peanuts Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
Argentina 292 239 300 226 177 185 42%
China -220 -346 -135 540 450 525 -148%
Gambia 15 20 21 8 11 15 68%
India -420 -474 -339 100 100 125 -488%
Malawi 4 5 4 2 3 3 72%
Nigeria 151 168 170 0 0 0 16270%
Senegal 44 42 28 2 4 5 1171%
South Africa 33 26 41 20 16 35 49%
USA 501 387 409 255 141 231 116%
Total Net Exports 401 66 499 1153 902 1124 -71%
Net Importers
Canada 107 97 102 116 107 110 -8%
European Union 419 408 435 457 441 463 -7%
Mexico 88 58 65 101 72 75 -15%
Rest of the World -403 -507 -164 290 272 415 -222%
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0%
Total Net Imports 401 66 499 1153 902 1124 -71%
Peanuts Price US Run. 40/50, CIF Rotterdam $/m 964 1051 823 820 888 700 18%
Peanut Meal Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
Argentina 62 45 43 67 50 52 -11%
China 49 56 63 9 15 25 290%
Gambia 5 10 10 5 10 10 -3%
India 96 124 171 10 20 100 482%
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 -7%
Nigeria -3 -3 -3 0 0 0 -316%
Senegal 127 140 138 130 144 140 -2%
South Africa -5 0 0 -5 0 0 -10%
USA -37 -44 -32 6 5 5 -809%
Rest of the World -62 -67 -69 8 14 -12 -326%
Total Net Exports 231 260 321 230 258 320 0%
Net Importers
European Union 187 196 179 186 194 178 1%
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0%
Total Net Imports 231 260 321 230 258 320 0%
Peanut Meal Price 48/50% CIF Rotterdam 123 135 126 122 134 125 1%
Peanut Oil Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
Argentina 43 37 36 46 41 42 -10%
China 35 41 34 0 5 2 1939%
Gambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 5%
India 63 76 54 0 0 0 6423%
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Nigeria 32 31 27 35 35 30 -10%
Senegal 95 99 107 98 102 109 -2%
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2%
USA -32 -68 -39 2 -30 -10 -421%
Rest of the World -37 -52 -37 18 11 8 -479%
Total Net Exports 199 165 181 199 164 181 0%
Net Importers
European Union 150 111 120 150 110 120 1%
Residual 49 54 61 49 54 61 0%
Total Net Imports 199 165 181 199 164 181 0%
Peanut Oil Price CIF Rotterdam $/mt 756 698 670 744 685 659 2%
welfare (million dollars) 633 758 568 653
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Table 5. Impact of peanut trade liberalization (GMTL scenario)
new levels after reform baseline levels average change
99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 for 3 years
Peanuts Trade
Net Exporters
Argentina 292 239 299 226 177 185 42%
China -224 -348 -143 540 450 525 -149%
Gambia 15 20 21 8 11 15 68%
India -421 -474 -342 100 100 125 -490%
Malawi 4.0 5.2 4.3 2 3 3 71%
Nigeria 150 167 168 0 0 0 16191%
Senegal 44 42 27 2 4 5 1163%
South Africa 33 26 41 20 16 35 49%
USA 512 390 431 255 141 231 121%
Total Net Exports 405 67 507 1,153 902 1,124 -71%
Net Importers
Canada 107 97 102 116 107 110 -8%
European Union 419 408 435 457 441 463 -7%
Mexico 88 58 65 101 72 75 -15%
Rest of the World -398 -505 -157 290 272 415 -220%
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0%
Total Net Imports 405 67 507 1,153 902 1,124 -71%
Peanuts Price: US Runners 40/50, CIF Rotterd 963 1,051 822 820 888 700 18%
Peanut Meal Trade
Net Exporters
Argentina 62.48 44.74 43.45 67.00 50.00 52.00 -11%
China 48.92 56.35 62.30 9.00 15.00 25.00 290%
Gambia 4.78 9.71 9.85 5.00 10.00 10.00 -3%
India 95.46 123.48 170.79 10.00 20.00 100.00 481%
Malawi -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 -7%
Nigeria -3.09 -3.43 -3.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 -318%
Senegal 126.68 139.86 137.69 130.00 144.00 140.00 -2%
South Africa -5.12 -0.24 -0.09 -5.00 0.00 0.00 -10%
USA -36.80 -43.78 -31.42 6.00 5.00 5.00 -806%
Rest of the World -61.78 -66.96 -68.71 8.00 14.00 -12.00 -326%
Total Net Exports 231.45 259.66 320.79 230.00 258.00 320.00 0.5%
Net Importers
European Union 187 196 179 186 194 178 1%
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0%
Total Net Imports 231 260 321 230 258 320 1%
Peanut Meal Price: 48/50% CIF Rotterdam 123 135 126 122 134 125 0.5%
Peanut Oil Trade
Net Exporters
A r g e n t i n a 4 3 3 7 3 6 4 64 14 2 - 1 0 %
China 35 41 33 0 5 2 1933%
Gambia 0.02 0.00 0.11 0 0 0 4%
India 63 76 53 0 0 0 6402%
Malawi -0.014 -0.010 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1%
Nigeria 32 31 26 35 35 30 -10%
Senegal 95 99 107 98 102 109 -2%
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3%
USA -31 -68 -39 2 -30 -10 -420%
Rest of the World -37 -51 -37 18 11 8 -477%
Total Net Exports 200 165 182 199 164 181 0%
Net Importers
European Union 151 111 121 150 110 120 1%
Residual 49 54 61 49 54 61 0%
Total Net Imports 200 165 182 199 164 181 0%
Peanut Oil Price: CIF Rotterdam 756 697 669 744 685 659 1.7%
Welfare 632 759 561 651
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Table 6. Impact of China and India full liberalization (CIFTL scenario)
New levels after reform baseline levels average change
1999/2000  2000/01 2001/02 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 for 3 years (%)
Peanuts Trade
Net Exporters
Argentina 261 210 233 226 177 185 20%
China -366 -510 -235 540 450 525 -175%
Gambia 12 17 20 8 11 15 47%
India -127 -183 -110 100 100 125 -233%
Malawi 10 10 10 2 3 3 284%
Nigeria 108 124 124 0 0 0 11891%
Senegal 39 44 32 2 4 5 1137%
South Africa 32 25 41 20 16 35 45%
USA 428 307 364 255 141 231 81%
Total Net Exports 398 45 478 1153 902 1124 -73%
Net Importers
Canada 107 97 103 116 107 110 -8%
European Union 426 414 439 457 441 463 -6%
Mexico 89 59 65 101 72 75 -14%
Rest of the World -414 -536 -189 290 272 415 -228%
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0%
Total Net Imports 398 45 478 1153 902 1124 -73%
Peanuts Price US Run. 40/50, CIF Rotterdam $/mt 951 1037 818 820 888 700 17%
Peanut Meal Trade
Net Exporters
A r g e n t i n a 7 15 25 66 75 05 2 6 %
China 168 186 178 9 15 25 1173%
Gambia 6 11 11 5 10 10 15%
India -206 -194 -124 10 20 100 -1151%
M a l a w i 0000001 8 %
Nigeria 19 20 26 0 0 0 2154%
Senegal 140 154 147 130 144 140 7%
South Africa -4 2 1 -5 0 0 108%
U S A 0- 62655 - 1 2 9 %
Rest of the World 13 9 2 8 14 -12 -30%
Total Net Exports 207 234 300 230 258 320 -8%
Net Importers
European Union 163 170 158 186 194 178 -12%
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0%
Total Net Imports 207 234 300 230 258 320 -8%
Meal Price 48/50% CIF Rotterdam $/mt 144 159 148 122 134 125 18%
Peanut Oil Trade
Net Exporters
A r g e n t i n a 4 74 24 64 64 14 2 5 %
China 63 73 68 0 5 2 3650%
G a m b i a 3340003 2 8 %
India -87 -74 -106 0 0 0 -8920%
M a l a w i 1110001 0 3 %
N i g e r i a 5 45 45 43 53 53 0 6 3 %
Senegal 106 113 117 98 102 109 9%
S o u t h  A f r i c a 1110001 2 4 %
USA -5 -45 -17 2 -30 -10 -81%
Rest of the World 4 -11 6 18 11 8 -100%
Total Net Exports 188 157 173 199 164 181 -5%
Net Importers
European Union 139 103 112 150 110 120 -7%
Residual 49 54 61 49 54 61 0%
Total Net Imports 188 157 173 199 164 181 -5%
Peanut Oil Price CIF Rotterdam $/mt 855 793 767 744 685 659 16%
Welfare effects (million $) 595 721 534 - - - 617   
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Table 7. Welfare effects of policy scenarios in million dollars at 1995 prices (average 1999-2001)
Country FMTL&US FMTL GMTL&US GMTL CIFTL
argentina 24 24 21 21 20
EU-15 -77 -77 -75 -75 -83
China 361 362 347 349 416
India 147 148 166 167 162
Rest of the world 14 13 108 107 54
Canada -11 -11 -11 -10 -10
Mexico -14 -14 -13 -13 -12
Senegal 38 38 26 26 16
Nigeria 22 22 19 19 19
South Africa 3 3 3 3 2
Malawi 7 7 7 7 -2
Gambia 1 1 1 1 1
USA 47 42 53 48 36
Africa-5 total
1 72 72 57 56 35
Total 562 559 653 651 617
1. Denotes the aggregate of Senegal, Nigeria, South Africa, Malai, and the Gambia.  